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We consider the task of anonymously transmitting a quantum message in a network. We present a
protocol that accomplishes this task using the W state and we analyze its performance in a quantum
network where some form of noise is present. We then compare the performance of our protocol with
some of the existing protocols developed for the task of anonymous transmission. We show that,
in many regimes, our protocol tolerates more noise and achieves higher fidelities of the transmitted
quantum message than the other ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our protocol tolerates
one nonresponsive node. We prove the security of our protocol in a semiactive adversary scenario,
meaning that we consider an active adversary and a trusted source.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptographic scenarios we are often concerned with
hiding the content of the messages being exchanged.
However, sometimes the identity of the parties who com-
municate may also carry relevant information. Examples
of tasks where the identities of the ones who communicate
carry crucial information are voting, electronic auctions
[1] or, more practically, sending a message to a secret
beloved [2]. Therefore, the establishment of anonymous
links in a network, where identities of connected parties
remain secret, is an important primitive for both classical
[3] and quantum communication.
In this paper we consider a task of anonymously trans-
mitting a quantum message in a network. To define the
task more precisely, consider a quantum network with N
nodes. One of the nodes, sender S, would like to commu-
nicate a quantum state |ψ〉 to a receiver R in a way that
their identities remain completely hidden throughout the
protocol. In particular, for S it implies that her identity
remains unknown to all the other parties, whereas for R
it implies that no one except S knows her identity. The
essence of the protocol is to create an entangled link be-
tween S and R by performing local operations on the
other nodes of the network. Such a link is called anony-
mous entanglement (AE) [4], since the identities of the
nodes holding the shares of the entangled pair is kept
anonymous. After anonymous entanglement is created,
S and R use it as a resource for teleporting the quantum
information |ψ〉. Note that the main goal of anonymous
transmission is to fully hide the identities of the sender
and the receiver; it does not aim at guaranteeing the re-
liability of the transmitted message.
A number of protocols have been proposed to tackle
this task, which was first introduced in [4]. There, the au-
thors present a protocol which makes use of a given mul-
tipartite Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state as a
quantum resource, i.e., |GHZN 〉 = 1√2 (|0 . . . 0〉+|1 . . . 1〉).
The problem was subsequently developed to consider the
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preparation and certification of the GHZ state [5, 6].
In [6], it was first shown that the proposed protocol is
information-theoretically secure against an active adver-
sary. What is more, other protocols were proposed, which
do not make use of multipartite entanglement, but uti-
lize solely Bell pairs to create anonymous entanglement
[7]. Yet, so far, it has not been discussed whether multi-
partite states other than the GHZ allow for anonymous
transmission of a quantum state. Moreover, nothing is
known about the performance of such protocols in a real-
istic quantum network, where one inevitably encounters
different forms of noise.
Here we design a protocol for quantum anony-
mous transmissions which uses the W state, |W〉N =
1√
N
(|10 . . . 0〉 + · · · + |0 . . . 01〉). Just like other existing
protocols, our protocol is based on establishing anony-
mous entanglement between S and R. We prove the
security of our protocol in a semiactive adversary sce-
nario, meaning that we consider an active adversary and
a trusted source, as in [4]. We also show that security is
preserved in the presence of noise in the network, when
all the particles are subjected to the same type of noise.
What is more, we compare the performance of our pro-
tocol with previously proposed protocols that use the
GHZ state and Bell pairs. We quantify the performance
of protocols by the fidelity of the transmitted quantum
state. We find that, in many cases, our W-state based
protocol tolerates more noise than the other protocols
and achieves higher fidelity of the transmitted state. Ad-
ditionally, we show that our protocol can tolerate one
nonresponsive node, e.g., if one of the qubits of a multi-
partite state gets lost. In contrast, the protocol using the
GHZ state cannot be carried out at all in this case, since
the loss of a single qubit destroys the entanglement of the
state. We also address the performance of the Bell-pair
based protocol, presented in [7], and we show that in the
presence of noise, the performance of the protocol de-
pends on the ordering of S and R in the network. To the
best of our knowledge this is the first analysis of anony-
mous transmission in the presence of noise. Without such
an analysis the performance of near-future applications
for quantum networks cannot be characterized [8].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present
the protocol for anonymous transmission with the W
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2state and discuss its correctness. In Sec. III, we pro-
vide the security definition and prove that our protocol
is secure in the semiactive and passive adversary scenario.
Finally, in Sec. IV we examine the behavior of our proto-
col in a noisy quantum network and compare it with the
other existing protocols.
II. THE PROTOCOL
Our anonymous transmission protocol, Protocol 1, al-
lows a sender S to transmit an arbitrary quantum state
|ψ〉 to a receiver R in an anonymous way and uses the
N -partite W state as a quantum resource.
Protocol 1: Anonymous transmission with the W state.
Goal: Transmit a quantum state |ψ〉 from the sender S
to the receiver R, while keeping the identities of S and R
anonymous.
1. Collision detection.
Nodes run the classical collision detection protocol [9]
to determine a single sender S. All nodes input 1 if
they do wish to be the sender and 0 otherwise. If a
single node wants to be the sender, continue.
2. Receiver notification.
Nodes run the classical receiver notification protocol [9],
where the receiver R is notified of her role.
3. State distribution.
A trusted source distributes the N -partite W state.
4. Measurement.
N − 2 nodes (all except for S and R) measure in the
{|0〉 , |1〉} basis.
5. Anonymous announcement of outcomes.
Nodes use the classical veto protocol [9] which outputs
0 if all the N − 2 measurement outcomes are 0, and 1
otherwise. If the output is 0 then anonymous entangle-
ment is established, else abort.
6. Teleportation.
Sender S teleports the message state |ψ〉 to the receiver
R. Classical message m associated with teleportation
is sent anonymously. The communication is carried out
using the classical logical OR protocol [9] which com-
putes m ⊕ rand, where rand is a random 2-bit string
input by the receiver R.
Protocol 1 is built on a number of classical subroutines
– collision detection, receiver notification, veto and log-
ical OR. Specifically: collision detection checks whether
only one of the nodes wishes to be the sender; receiver
notification notifies the receiver of her role in the proto-
col; veto announces if at least one of the parties has given
input 1; and logical OR computes the XOR of the input
of all the parties. In Ref. [9], protocols for implementing
these classical subroutines were proposed. The protocols
were proven to be information-theoretically secure in the
classical regime, even with an arbitrary number of cor-
rupted participants, assuming the parties share pairwise
authenticated private channels and a broadcast channel.
However, security against a quantum adversary was not
analyzed. Like in related work [6], here we will assume
that the protocols listed above remain secure even in the
presence of a quantum adversary. We make this assump-
tion explicit in the security proof presented in App. A 2,
where we assume that the classical subprotocols only act
on the classical input register and create the output reg-
ister, therefore, not revealing any information other than
what is specified by the protocol.
The main concern of any anonymous transmission pro-
tocol is to hide the identities of sender S and receiver
R. Nonetheless, it is also desired that, in the case in
which all the parties act honestly, no information about
the transmitted message is revealed. In order to achieve
this functionality we add the step where R randomizes
the output of the logical OR in Step 6 of Protocol 1. In
that way, the classical outcome of the teleportation, m,
is sent from S to R in a secret way. Indeed, even though
the classical bit m could be sent by a simple anonymous
broadcast protocol, the probability of obtaining a partic-
ular outcome m can depend on which state is teleported
if the established anonymous entanglement is not a max-
imally entangled state. This is the case especially in the
presence of noise in the network (for more details see
App. A 3).
Note that our protocol is probabilistic, as the parties
may abort in Step 5. However, since the measurement
outcomes are announced, the creation of anonymous en-
tanglement is heralded. Hence, S and R know when the
anonymous entanglement failed to be established before
they initiate the teleportation, so in the case in which the
protocol aborts, S keeps the state |ψ〉. In the following
we first state the correctness of the protocol and then
elaborate on the probability of success in the protocol,
as a function of the number of parties in the network N .
Lemma 1 (correctness). If all the parties act honestly
and Protocol 1 does not abort, the state |ψ〉 is transferred
from the sender S to the receiver R, except with probabil-
ity corr, where corr is an exponentially vanishing func-
tion of the number of rounds used to implement the clas-
sical subroutines.
Proof. First, recall that Protocol 1 is built on several
classical subroutines and in Ref. [9], protocols to im-
plement these subroutines were presented. The proto-
cols were proven to be correct except with a proba-
bility that vanishes exponentially with the number of
rounds nclass used to implement the subroutines. Sec-
ondly, conditioned on the fact that the classical subrou-
tines are correct and the parties act honestly, the mea-
surement in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis can lead to two situations:
(i) all parties obtain measurement outcome 0, in which
case the anonymous entangled state between S and R is
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉), or (ii) a single party obtains a
measurement outcome 1 and then the state between S
and R is |00〉, in which case they abort the protocol. If
3the parties do not abort the protocol in Step 5, then the
state shared by S and R is the maximally entangled state
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉), which is then used to perfectly
teleport state |ψ〉 from S to R. Altogether, this implies
that Protocol 1 is correct except with probability corr
which vanishes exponentially with nclass.
Lemma 2 (probability of success). Given sender S and
receiver R, the probability of obtaining the anonymous
entangled state |ψ+〉 in Step 4 of Protocol 1 is 2N .
Proof. Let |~0〉〈~0|N−2 denote the projection on the |0〉
state of N − 2 parties. The probability Pψ+ of
obtaining this state can be expressed as Pψ+ =
Tr
[
|W〉〈W|N ·
(
1SR ⊗ |~0〉〈~0|N−2
)]
= 2N Tr[|ψ+〉〈ψ+|] =
2
N .
Lem. 2 states that in the honest implementation, the
probability of not aborting in Step 4 of Protocol 1 de-
creases with the number of parties. Protocols based on
the GHZ state [4, 6], on the other hand, are determin-
istic in creating anonymous entanglement. However, we
remark that a fair comparison between the success rate of
the two protocols should also take into account the rate
of state generation. Note that recently, a linear opti-
cal setup for generating the W state in nitrogen-vacancy
systems was proposed [10], which could offer a potential
advantage in generation rates of the W state, over the
GHZ state.
III. SECURITY
As discussed in the previous section, in the task of
anonymous transmission the main goal is to keep the
identities of sender S and receiver R secret. In this sec-
tion we present the security definitions and prove the
security of Protocol 1 against a semiactive adversary.
Let [N ] = {1, . . . , N} be the set of nodes. We say that
dishonest nodes are a subset A ∈ [N ], with |A| = t. This
set is defined at the beginning of the protocol, which is
known as a nonadaptive adversary.
Definition 1 (semiactive adversary). We define the
semiactive adversary scenario as one in which the adver-
saries are active, i.e., can perform arbitrary joint opera-
tions on their state during the execution of the protocol,
but the source distributing a quantum state is trusted.
In particular, for Protocol 1 this means that the state
in Step 3 is exactly the W state. This adversarial model
is stronger than a passive adversary, where it is assumed
that the parties follow all the steps of the protocol and
only collect the available classical information. However,
note that a fully active adversarial scenario would allow
the cheating participants to corrupt the source.
We define security in terms of the guessing probability,
i.e., the maximum probability that adversaries guess the
identity of the S or R given all the classical and quantum
information they have available at the end of the proto-
col. Intuitively, we say that the protocol is secure when
the guessing probability is no larger than the uncertainty
the adversaries have about the identity of the sender be-
fore the protocol begins. This uncertainty is defined by
the prior probability, P [S = i|S /∈ A]. For example, in
the case where all the nodes are equally likely to be the
sender, the prior probability is uniform and, therefore,
P [S = i|S /∈ A] = 1N−t .
In Protocol 1 it is assumed that the message |ψ〉 to be
sent carries no information about the sender’s identity.
We remark that anonymous transmission is concerned
with ensuring anonymity and not secrecy. In the case
in which secrecy of the message is required, anonymous
transmission could be combined with another primitive
that allows one to encrypt the message. However, here,
we do not address this issue.
Definition 2 (guessing probability). Let A be the sub-
set of semiactive adversaries. Let C be the register that
contains all classical and quantum side information acces-
sible to the adversaries. Let WA denote the adversaries’
quantum register of the state distributed by the source.
Then, the probability of adversaries guessing the sender
is given by
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] =
= max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr[M i · ρWAC|S=i], (1)
where the maximization is taken over the set of POVMs
{M i} for the adversaries and ρWAC|S=i is the state of the
adversaries at the end of the protocol, given that node i
is the sender.
Definition 3 (sender security). We say that an anony-
mous transmission protocol is sender-secure if, given that
the sender is honest, the probability of the adversary
guessing the sender is
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] ≤ max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A]. (2)
In words, the protocol is sender-secure if the probabil-
ity that the adversaries guess the identity of S at the end
of the protocol is not larger than the probability that an
honest node i is the sender, maximized over all the nodes.
An analogous definition can be given for the receiver se-
curity.
We remark that, even if S and R are honest, it is triv-
ially possible for themalicious parties to prevent S and R
from exchanging the desired message. For example, the
dishonest parties can measure the W state in a different
basis affecting the resulting anonymous entanglement. In
this sense, the correctness of Protocol 1 is not robust to
malicious attacks. However, in what follows, we show
that Protocol 1 is secure, and even in the presence of dis-
honest parties, the anonymity of S and R is preserved.
4Theorem 1. The anonymous transmission protocol with
the W state, Protocol 1, is sender- and receiver-secure in
the semiactive adversary scenario.
Idea of the proof. For clarity, here we present the main
idea of our security proof and we refer the reader to
App. A 3 for details. Note that in the semiactive adver-
sary scenario we allow the adversaries to apply an arbi-
trary cheating strategy, which in particular includes not
following the steps of the protocol and performing global
operations on their joint state. First, let us discuss the
sender security. We consider the case when R is hon-
est, R /∈ A, as well as when she is dishonest, R ∈ A.
In both cases, the gist of our sender-security proof is to
show that the reduced quantum state of the adversary
ρWAC|S=i at the end of the protocol is independent of
the sender, i.e., ∀i /∈ A, ρWAC|S=i = ρWAC . To show it,
we explicitly use the assumption that the classical proto-
cols do not leak any information about S or R’s identity
even if the adversary has access to quantum correlations.
Therefore, any quantum side information the adversary
holds is independent of S. This, together with the fact
that the state distributed by the source is permutation-
ally invariant yields the desired equality. Since now the
reduced quantum state of the adversary is independent
of S we can easily upper-bound the guessing probability
by maxi∈[N ] P [S = i|S /∈ A]. The receiver security can
be proven following the same structure.
Note that our security proof tolerates any number of
cheating nodes. It is also general enough to make a secu-
rity statement about any resource state that is invariant
under permutation of nodes.
Let us now discuss a passive adversarial model, also
called the honest-but-curious model. This is the case
when the malicious parties follow all the steps of the
protocol (in particular, they measure in the {0, 1} ba-
sis in Step 4), but can collaborate to compare their
classical data. Note that the passive adversary model
is a special case of the semiactive adversary scenario.
However, this model is interesting by itself, since in the
case in which the nodes build their anonymous trans-
mission protocol using weaker versions of classical sub-
routines, i.e., those that are not secure against quan-
tum adversary, the security still holds. Indeed, it re-
stricts the power of the adversary, so that they cannot
share any quantum side information. Then, the prob-
ability of the adversaries guessing the sender simplifies
to Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] =
∑
a,c P [W
A = a,C =
c] maxi∈[N ] P [S = i|WA = a,C = c, S /∈ A], where maxi-
mization is taken over all the values of the random vari-
able S, and a, c are possible values of random variables
WA and C respectively [11]. Note that, unlike before,
here WA is a classical register of the adversary, since
their share of the W state was measured in the {0, 1} ba-
sis. An analogous expression holds for receiver-security.
Theorem 2. The anonymous transmission protocol with
the W state, Protocol 1, is sender- and receiver-secure in
the passive adversary scenario.
The proof of this statement is a special case of the
proof of Thm. 1. As before, we use the fact that classical
protocols do not leak identities of S and R and the per-
mutational invariance of the resource state to conclude
that the classical information generated during the pro-
tocol is independent of who is sender and receiver. For
details see App. A 3.
IV. ANONYMOUS TRANSMISSION IN A
NOISY QUANTUM NETWORK
Equipped with the security tools from the previous sec-
tion, here we analyze the security and performance of
Protocol 1 in a noisy quantum network. We consider a
noise model in which each qubit is subjected to the same
individual noisy channel. One can think that a trusted
source prepared the multipartite state for the network,
but each qubit is individually affected by a noise map
Λ while being transmitted to the nodes. Note that this
model can also encompass noise on the local measure-
ments performed on the state. Therefore, in our noisy
network, if |W〉N is the perfect N -partite W state pre-
pared by a trusted source, then
ωΛN = Λ
⊗N (|W〉〈W|N ) (3)
is the state distributed to the parties at Step 3 of Proto-
col 1.
A. Security in the presence of noise
Perfect security. In what follows we will show that
our protocol is perfectly secure in the semiactive adver-
sary scenario in the noisy network defined by Eq. (3).
We start by defining what it means for a map to pre-
serve permutational invariance.
Definition 4 (Permutational-invariance preserving
map). Let pi be a permutationally invariant state, such
that for all permutations Σ, pi = VΣ (pi), where VΣ is
a map that performs the permutation Σ on the subsys-
tems. A map E is permutational-invariance preserving if
the state after the action of the map pi′ = E(pi) is permu-
tationally invariant, i.e., pi′ = VΣ (pi′).
Note that the noise channel of our interest, Λ⊗N , pre-
serves permutational invariance according to the above
definition, due to the tensor structure.
Theorem 3. The anonymous transmission protocol with
the W state, Protocol 1, is sender- and receiver-secure
in the semiactive adversary scenario in a noisy network,
where noise is defined by Eq. (3).
Proof. According to Def. 4, the noise channel Λ⊗N
is permutational-invariance preserving. Therefore, the
proof of Thm. 3 follows exactly the same steps as the
proof of Thm. 1, where one replaces the state distributed
5by the source, |W〉〈W|N , with ωΛN . Therefore if ρΛWAC|S=i
is the state of the adversaries at the end of the pro-
tocol, given that node i is the sender, we have that
ρΛWAC|S=i = ρ
Λ
WAC , for all i /∈ A, and
Pguess[S|A,C, S /∈ A] :=
= max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
≤ max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A].
(4)
The same statement holds for receiver-security.
ε security. In a realistic quantum network, it is quite
unlikely that one will be able to control the noise chan-
nels perfectly and ensure that all qubits are subjected
to the action of exactly the same noise channel. Here
we would like to analyze what happens in the case when
the network noise is slightly perturbed, in the sense that
each qubit experiences a slightly different noise. We say
that in the perturbed case, the network noise is such that
each individual qubit of the multipartite W state, |W〉N ,
is subjected to an action of a channel Λi,
ωˆΛN =
N⊗
i=1
Λi(|W〉〈W|N ), (5)
where ‖ Λ−Λi ‖1≤ εi for some map Λ, and ‖ · ‖1 denotes
the induced trace norm [12].
Since each channel is slightly perturbed, the state after
the action of the channel, ωˆΛN , is no longer perfectly per-
mutationally invariant. Yet, intuitively, since the pertur-
bation is small, the state ωˆΛN is ε-close to a permutation-
ally invariant state, for some small ε, and, consequently,
the protocol should be ε-secure. In the following we show
that this intuition is, indeed, true. First, let us formalize
the notion of ε security.
Definition 5 (ε-sender security). We say that the
anonymous transmission protocol is ε-sender-secure if,
given that the sender is not the adversary, the probabil-
ity of the adversaries guessing the sender is
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] ≤ max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] + ε. (6)
And analogously for ε-receiver security.
Theorem 4. The anonymous transmission protocol with
the W state, Protocol 1, is Nεmax-sender-secure in the
semiactive adversary scenario when the noise in the net-
work is defined by Eq. (5), i.e.,
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A]
= max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr
[
M i · ρˆΛWAC|S=i
]
≤ max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] +Nεmax,
(7)
where ρˆΛWAC|S=i is the state of the adversaries at the end
of the protocol, and εmax = maxi∈[N ] εi, with εi given by
Eq. (5).
The idea of the proof is to show that, for all i ∈
[N ], the trace Tr
[
M i · ρˆΛWAC|S=i
]
is upper-bounded by
Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
+ Nεmax. Then using the fact that
Nεmax is independent of i, the rest of the proof follows
from Thm. 3. For details see App. A 3.
B. Performance in a noisy network
In this section we analyze the performance of Proto-
col 1 in a noisy quantum network. To do so reliably, we
assume honest implementation; i.e., all of the parties fol-
low the protocol. In the honest implementation, given
success in the protocol, the anonymous entangled state
between S and R after Step 5. is
ωSR =
1
N TrN−2
[
Λ⊗N (|W〉〈W|N ) ·
(
1SR ⊗ |~0〉〈~0|N−2
)]
,
(8)
where |W〉〈W|N is the N -partite W state, |~0〉〈~0|N−2 is a
projection onto the |0〉 state of N − 2 parties and N is
a normalization factor. Note that in the case where no
noise is present we recover the maximally entangled state,
i.e. ωSR = |ψ+〉〈ψ+|, where |ψ+〉 = 1√2 (|01〉+ |01〉).
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will be interested
in discussing the performance of anonymous transmission
protocols under two types of noise:
1. Λ is the dephasing channel
Λ(ρ) = Pq(ρ) = qρ+ (1− q)ZρZ, (9)
where ρ is a single qubit state, Z is the Pauli Z
gate, and q ∈ [0, 1] is the noise parameter.
2. Λ is the depolarizing channel
Λ(ρ) = Dq(ρ) = qρ+ (1− q)1
2
, (10)
where ρ is a single qubit state, 12 is a maximally
mixed single-qubit state, and q ∈ [0, 1] is the noise
parameter.
Comparison with the GHZ protocol [4]. In the
following we are interested in comparing the performance
of our protocol using the W state with the protocol that
uses the GHZ state (for reference see [4, 6]). The main
differences between our protocol and the protocol pre-
sented in [4] lie in (i) the initial resource state: W in our
case and GHZ for [4]; (ii) the measurement basis: stan-
dard basis for our protocol and X basis for [4]; (iii) the
fact that our protocol is probabilistic, whereas the one
6with the GHZ state continues regardless of the measure-
ment outcome.
For the noise under consideration, all measurement
outcomes in the GHZ protocol are equally likely and the
resulting states are equivalent up to a local unitary oper-
ation. Therefore, without loss of generality, we consider
the state between S and R created in this protocol to be
γSR =
1
N ′ TrN−2
[
Λ⊗N (|GHZ〉〈GHZ|N )
·
(
1SR ⊗
∣∣~+〉〈~+∣∣
N−2
) ]
,
(11)
where |GHZ〉〈GHZ|N is the N -partite GHZ state,∣∣~+〉〈~+∣∣
N−2 is a projection onto the |+〉 state of N − 2
honest parties and N ′ is a normalization factor. In
the case where no noise is present in the network, the
ideal state of S and R is the maximally entangled state
γSR = |φ+〉〈φ+|, with |φ+〉 = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉). Note that
this is a different maximally entangled state than in our
W state protocol, but both states are equally useful for
teleportation.
To compare the performance of the two protocols, we
fix the figure of merit to be the fidelity of the obtained
anonymous entangled (AE) state with the ideal state that
is obtained in the protocol when no noise is present,
FAE(ωSR) = Tr
[
ωSR ·
∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣] (12)
FAE(γSR) = Tr
[
γSR ·
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣] (13)
where ωSR and γSR are anonymous entangled states be-
tween S and R arising from measuring W and GHZ states
subjected to the network noise.
In what follows we define what it means for an anoy-
mous entangled state to be useful. Before that, let us
motivate it twofold. First, not all states are entangled
enough to be a resource for teleportation. It has been
shown in [13] that any two-qubit entangled state can be
used for teleportation if and only if its singlet fidelity ex-
ceeds 12 . Secondly, note that the quality of a low-fidelity
anonymous entanglement could be further improved by
performing entanglement distillation [14] – a protocol
which creates an entangled state with high fidelity out of
a few lower-fidelity states. However, entanglement dis-
tillation protocols can be carried out only when fidelities
of initial states are larger than 12 . We remark that per-
forming entanglement distillation without compromising
security of anonymous transfer requires support of anony-
mous two-way classical communication between S and R.
This can be achieved, for example, by using a classical
anonymous broadcast protocol [9].
We are now ready to define what it means to say that
a resource state is useful for anonymous transmission.
Definition 6 (Usefulness). We say that the anonymous
entangled state is a useful resource for transmission of
a quantum message if its fidelity is strictly larger than
1
2 , i.e. FAE >
1
2 . Therefore an N -partite state is a use-
ful resource state for anonymous transmission if, upon
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FIG. 1: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement as a
function of the noise parameter q for depolarizing
network noise. Examples for N = {4, 10, 50}.
the parties acting honestly, it can generate anonymous
entanglement between any two nodes with FAE > 12 .
To evaluate the behavior of the protocols, we calculate
the fidelity of anonymous entanglement as a function of
the noise parameter q and the number of nodes N , for
the depolarizing and dephasing channels. Examples of
the performance of the W and GHZ protocols for N =
{4, 10, 50} are shown in Fig. 1.
FAE(ωSR) FAE(γSR)
Dephasing noise P⊗Nq 1− 2q(1− q) 1+(2q−1)
N
2
Depolarizing noise D⊗Nq (1+q)(N(q−1)
2+4q(1+q))
4(N(1−q)+4q)
2qN+q2+1
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We can now ask ourselves which of the states, GHZ or
W, tolerates more noise. Note that if one has access to
both parameters of the network, noise parameter q and
number of nodes N , it is easy to determine which of the
states would perform better by simply looking at values
of FAE calculated from our analytical expressions.
We start by looking at the dephasing noise. Observe
that in this case the fidelity of anonymous entanglement
created with the W state FAE(ωSR) is constant in N .
Specifically, this implies that when fixed dephasing noise
is present in the network, the quality of the anonymous
link is always the same, regardless of the number of nodes
N . Moreover, for the dephasing noise, one can observe
that FAE(ωSR) ≥ FAE(γSR) for all N ≥ 2 and all q,
which implies that our Protocol 1 tolerates more noise
than the GHZ-based protocol [4, 6].
When depolarizing noise is present in the network, un-
like for the dephasing noise, the fidelity of the anonymous
entanglement generated by Protocol 1 decreases as the
number N of parties increases. Let us define the noise
threshold q∗ as the minimum value of noise parameter
q for which the anonymous entangled state is still use-
ful in the sense of Def. 6. One can see that, for small
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FIG. 2: Depolarizing parameter thresholds for fidelity of
anonymous entanglement FAE = 12 .
networks (e.g., N < 50), the threshold q∗ is lower for
the W state than for the GHZ state q∗W < q
∗
GHZ , see
Fig. 2, which implies that the W state tolerates more
noise in these cases. However, for N ≥ 182 one finds
that the converse is true, q∗W > q
∗
GHZ , and therefore the
GHZ-based protocol tolerates more noise in this regime.
Nevertheless, in App. B 2 we show that for N ≥ 182 and
larger values of q, q > q∗W , we still recover the behav-
ior FAE(ωSR) ≥ FAE(γSR). Lastly, we remark that the
challenge to create a multipartite state scales with the
number of parties. Therefore, applications of anonymous
transmission of interest in the near future will likely be
in the range of N < 50, in which case Protocol 1 has
proven to be the most noise-tolerant.
Let us also comment on the probability of success of
our protocol in the presence of noise. Recall that a round
of the protocol only succeeds if in Step 3 the measure-
ment outcome of the N − 2 measuring parties is 0. For
the dephasing noise the probability of success in our pro-
tocol remains 2N , which is due to the fact that the noise
commutes with the measurement basis. However, for the
depolarizing noise the probability of success drops ex-
ponentially in N . In contrast, for the GHZ state, the
outcomes do not need to be post-selected, therefore the
protocol [4] remains deterministic.
Comparison with the relay protocol [7]. We now
compare our protocol to a scheme proposed in Ref. [7],
which only requires the creation of local Bell pairs and
therefore could potentially offer an advantage for a quan-
tum network implementation. The main idea of the relay
protocol [7] is to locally prepare and transmit Bell pairs
in order to create a four-partite GHZ state, which will
then be turned into anonymous entanglement.
In the protocol proposed in Ref. [7], the nodes are con-
secutively ordered and each node locally prepares a Bell
pair. The first node sends half of her Bell pair to the sec-
ond node. The second node performs entanglement swap-
ping with a half of her own Bell pair and sends the other
half of the state to the next node. This relay continues
until the last N -th node is reached. S and R, however,
W
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FIG. 3: Comparison of the fidelity of anonymous
entanglement FAE for the W state protocol (Protocol
1), the GHZ protocol [4] and the relay scheme [7] for
N = 6 nodes.
perform an additional CNOT operation, where they lo-
cally entangle the state received from another node with
an additional qubit initiated in |0〉. At the end of this
relay a four-partite GHZ state is created among S, R, the
first and the last node. Finally, anonymous entanglement
is established after the first and the last node perform a
measurement.
We explore a scenario for N = 6 nodes, assuming that
the network is such that quantum channels between par-
ties are depolarizing channels Λ = Dq; i.e., whenever a
qubit is sent from one party to another it is subject to
depolarization. We calculate fidelities of anonymous en-
tanglement for different locations of the S and R in the
network. Our results are summarized in App. B 2. The
numerical evidence shows that in the presence of the de-
polarizing noise in the network, the fidelity of anonymous
entanglement is different depending on the ordering of S
and R in the network. Note that this does not necessar-
ily imply that the security of the protocol is broken, in
the sense that nodes can learn the identity of S and R.
However, we can see that the performance of the protocol
strongly depends on who is sender and receiver, which is
not a desirable feature for the anonymous transmission
task.
With this in mind, we define the usefulness of the
anonymous entanglement created with the relay scheme
as the worst case fidelity achieved by the scheme. This
is practical if one wants to make sure that the scheme
achieves at least a certain fidelity threshold. We then
compare the behavior of the relay scheme with the be-
havior of Protocol 1 in the presence of depolarizing noise.
In Fig. 3 one can see that in the presence of the depolariz-
ing noise in the network the relay protocol achieves lower
fidelity than both the GHZ and the W state protocols.
Nonresponsive nodes. Finally, let us consider the
scenario where some of the nodes, that are neither S nor
R, stop responding. This can happen, for example, due
to particle losses in the multipartite state. Note that if
S or R lose their particle the teleportation cannot be
8carried out and, therefore, the protocol is not correct.
Let us consider that the resource state prepared by the
source suffers from the action of a noise channel where
particles might get lost. Then, with some probability k
out of N nodes experience particle loss. Here we ask the
question of how many particles losses can be tolerated in
an anonymous transmission protocol. Say that a proto-
col tolerates k′ particle losses. After the distribution of
the state, if k particles are lost: (i) the nodes abort the
protocol if k > k′, or (ii) the remaining N − k parties
proceed with the protocol if k ≤ k′.
It is known that the entanglement of the GHZ state is
not robust to particle losses; i.e., if one particle is lost
the remaining N − 1 parties are left with a separable
state. On the other hand, if the W state is subjected
to N − 2 particle losses the remaining bipartite state is
still entangled. In fact, the W state is the most robust to
particle losses among all N qubit states [15]. Motivated
by this property of the W state, we show that Protocol
1 can tolerate one nonresponsive node. Observe that the
N -partite W state has the following form after tracing
out k out of N parties,
Trk |W〉〈W|N =
N − k
N
|W〉〈W|N−k +
k
N
|~0〉〈~0|N−k (14)
where |W〉〈W|N−k is the W state of N − k parties.
In the following theorem we show that Protocol 1 tol-
erates one particle loss.
Theorem 5. Protocol 1 tolerates one nonresponsive node
i ∈ [N ] \ {S,R} to produce useful anonymous entangle-
ment, regardless of the number of parties.
Proof. The proof of the above theorem involves two steps.
We first show the correctness of Protocol 1 when one
of the nodes stopped responding, and then show that
the created entangled link between S and R is in fact
anonymous, i.e. that the security is preserved.
Let us look at the correctness. The measurement of
the state (14) in the standard basis and after obtaining
all 0 outcomes on N − k − 2 parties yields a normalized
state
ω˜SR =
2
2 + k
∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣+ k
2 + k
|00〉〈00| (15)
which has entanglement fidelity FAE(ω˜SR) = 22+k . By
Def. 6 the state ω˜SR is useful for anonymous transmission
if 22+k >
1
2 which implies k < 2. This yields the desired
result.
To show that the created entanglement is anonymous,
observe that when one of the nodes stops responding the
resource state is the state from Eq. (14) with k = 1.
This state is invariant under permutations of nodes and,
therefore, we can treat it as a new resource state. Then
the security proof follows the same pattern as the proof
of Theorem 1.
For completeness, in App. B 2 we provide analytical
expressions for the fidelity of anonymous entanglement
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FIG. 4: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement as a
function of the noise parameter q for depolarizing
network noise when the resource W state is subjected to
one particle loss. Examples for N = {4, 10, 50}.
when the W state is subjected to one particle loss, as
well as dephasing and depolarizing noise. Fig. 4 shows
the comparison of anonymous entanglement fidelity of
Protocol 1 under depolarizing noise without particle loss,
FAE(ωSR), and when one particle is lost, FAE(ω˜SR), for
N = {4, 10, 50} nodes. Note that with the growing num-
ber of nodes the fidelity of anonymous entanglement in
the lossy case approaches the one with no-loss. Indeed,
the larger N the smaller the admixture of the |~0〉〈~0|N−1
term in Eq. (14), and so, with growing N the fidelity is
less affected by the loss of a particle. On the other hand,
for a larger number of nodes more than one particle loss is
more likely to occur. Therefore, the probability that the
protocol aborts also increases with the number of nodes.
Lastly, we point out that when one particle is lost in
the protocol of Ref. [7], the relay cannot be completed.
Therefore, much like the GHZ protocol, the relay proto-
col also cannot be used to create anonymous entangle-
ment whenever one of the nodes is not responsive.
V. OUTLOOK
We presented a protocol for quantum anonymous
transmission using the W state, and proved its security
in the semiactive adversary scenario, i.e. when the ad-
versary is active and the source of a quantum state is
trusted. Moreover, we analyzed the behavior of our pro-
tocol under the action of common noise models that occur
in a realistic quantum network. An important question
is whether our security proof can be extended to the case
where the source might be corrupted, i.e. the fully active
adversary scenario. Note that to achieve full security in
the noiseless case for the GHZ protocol, Refs. [6, 16] in-
troduced a certification step of the resource state shared
by the trusted parties. We remark that for the noise-
less W state protocol, it may be possible to achieve full
security in a similar way by employing self-testing tech-
niques [17, 18]. The problem of certifying the resource
9state in the presence of noise in the network remains an
open question.
We have also analyzed the security of our protocol
when each qubit suffers the action of a noise channel with
slightly different parameters. This bound, however, may
not be tight, so another interesting question is whether
the security proof can be improved and a stronger bound
can be derived for this case.
Finally, we have seen that in many instances our W-
state based protocol outperforms the GHZ-state and
Bell-pair based protocols. For the values of parametersN
and q, where all the protocols produce useful anonymous
entanglement, we remark that a more refined comparison
of their performance should take into account the gener-
ation rates and resources required to produce the states
in every particular experimental setup.
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Appendix A: Security
1. Classical subroutines
Our anonymous transmission protocol, Protocol 1, is built on a few classical subroutines. As mentioned, in Ref.
[9], protocols for implementing these classical subroutines were proposed. Here we list the protocols which we will use
as building blocks of our anonymous transmission protocol:
Theorem 6 (collision detection [9]). There exists an information-theoretically secure collision detection protocol that
takes as input the classical register Cdin of all the participants, Cdiin = 1 if node i wishes to be a sender and Cd
i
in = 0
otherwise, and outputs Cdout = 0 if only one register wants to be the sender and Cdout = 1 otherwise.
Theorem 7 (receiver notification [9]). There exists an information-theoretically secure receiver notification protocol
that takes as input the classical register Rnin of the participants and outputs Rnout, where RnRout = 1 for the receiver,
and all the other parties get output 0.
Theorem 8 (veto [9]). There exists an information-theoretically secure veto protocol that takes as input the classical
register Oin of the parties and outputs Oout = 0 if all the parties input 0, Oin = ~0, and Oout = 1 otherwise.
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Theorem 9 (logical OR [9]). There exists an information-theoretically secure logical OR protocol that takes as input
the classical register Tin and publicly outputs Tout = ⊕Ni=1T iin.
The protocols are information-theoretically secure, in the sense that they do not reveal any classical information
other than the one specified by the protocol. The security holds even with an arbitrary number of corrupted partici-
pants, assuming the parties share pairwise authenticated private channels and a broadcast channel. However, security
against a quantum adversary was not analyzed. Here we assume that the protocols listed above remain secure even
in the presence of a quantum adversary. This assumption is made explicit in Section A2 where we assume that the
classical subprotocols only act on the classical input register and create the output register, therefore not revealing
any information other than what is specified by the protocol, also in the quantum setting.
2. States and registers
In what follows we make a detailed description of the state in each step of Protocol 1. Our main goal is to show that
the quantum state of the adversary at the end of the protocol does not depend on who is the sender or the receiver.
We will later use this fact in the security proof in Sec. III.
Here we adopt the notation that A denotes registers held by the adversary A, and A¯ denotes all the other registers,
i.e., of the honest parties (including the sender and the receiver). After Step 2, i.e., once S and R are defined, we
distinguish S and R registers from the registers of honest parties H.
TABLE I: Registers available to parties at each step of the Protocol 1. All registers are classical unless specified
otherwise.
Step Available registers Description
0. A0, A¯0 Quantum side information of dishonest and honest parties before the beginning of Protocol 1.
1. CdAin, CdA¯in Private input of the parties in the collision detection protocol.
The node which wants to be a sender inputs 1, the rest 0.
CdAout, CdA¯out Outputs of the collision detection protocol.
2. RnAin, RnA¯in Private input of the receiver notification protocol.
S inputs the identifier of R, everyone else 0.
RnAout, RnA¯out Private outputs of receiver notification protocol.
Output 0 for R, 1 for everyone else.
DA, DHSR Redefined register of dishonest parties DA =
{
A0Cd
A
inCd
A
outRn
A
inRn
A
out
}
and honest parties DHSR =
{
A¯0Cd
A¯
inCd
A¯
outRn
A¯
inRn
A¯
out
}
after Step 2.
3. WH,WA,WS ,WR Quantum registers of the state prepared by the source.
4. WH,WA,WS ,WR Quantum registers of the state prepared by the source.
5. OHin Private input of the honest parties to the veto protocol.
Represented by a string of measurement outcomes ~ν.
OAin Private input of dishonest parties to the veto protocol.
Represented by a string of measurement outcomes ~µ.
Oout Public output of the veto protocol.
0 if all entries of strings ~ν and ~µ are 0, 1 otherwise.
6. Q Quantum register of quantum message |ψ〉 which S wants to transmit.
TSin, T
R
in Private inputs of S and R to the logical OR protocol.
S inputs teleportation message m and R inputs random bit rand.
THin , T
A
in Private input of the honest and dishonest parties to the logical OR protocol.
T Public outcome the logical OR protocol. Outputs XOR of all the inputs.
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In the following we specify what are the assumptions associated with each step of the protocol. Additionally, we
explicitly write out the state ξ(j) after each step j of the protocol, taking into account all the registers that play a
role in the particular step. Therefore, we remark that our notation may be cumbersome at the first glance. However,
we advise the reader to refer to Table I at any point of our proof.
Step 1. Collision detection.
Assumption 1. Let A0 be the quantum side information of dishonest parties and A¯0 be the quantum side information
of the honest parties, including sender and receiver, before the beginning of the protocol. We assume that before the
start of the protocol the parties share the following state:
ξ
(0)
A0A¯0CdinRnin
= σ
(0)
A0A¯0CdAinRn
A
in
⊗ σ(0)
CdA¯inRn
A¯
in
. (A1)
In words, we assume the adversaries have a quantum side information, A0, and classical inputs to the collision detection
and receiver notification protocol, CdAin and Rn
A
in, that might be correlated with some quantum side information A¯0 of
the remaining parties. However the inputs of the honest parties CdA¯in and Rn
A¯
in are uncorrelated with the adversary’s
state.
Assumption 2. We assume that the classical collision detection protocol is secure against a quantum adversary,
that is, it acts on classical registers Cdin and outputs Cdout without revealing any other information to the dishonest
parties. In particular, if sender and receiver are honest, it does not leak their identity.
Let ξ(1)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRnin
be the global output state after collision detection (Step 1). Ass. 2 implies that tracing out
the registers of honest parties (all registers of A¯) we obtain a partial state of the adversary (all registers of A) which is
independent of the sender, if the sender is honest. That is, for all honest parties, ∀i /∈ A, the state after the collision
detection step (Step 1 of Protocol 1) is
TrA¯0CdA¯inCdA¯outRnA¯in
(
ξ
(1)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRnin|S=i
)
= ξ
(1)
A0CdAinCd
A
outRn
A
in|S=i
(A2)
= ξ
(1)
A0CdAinCd
A
outRn
A
in
. (A3)
Step 2. Receiver notification.
Assumption 3. We assume that the classical receiver notification protocol is secure against the quantum adversary;
that is, the protocol acts on the classical register Rnin and outputs Rnout, without revealing any other information
to the dishonest parties. In particular, if sender and receiver are honest, it does not leak their identity.
Let the input state to the receiver notification protocol be ξ(1)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRnin
and the output state conditioned on
node i being the sender be ξ(2)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRninRnout|S=i. Ass. 3 implies that, again, tracing out the registers of honest
parties (all registers of A¯) we obtain a partial state of the adversary (all registers of A) which is independent of the
sender. That is, for all honest parties ∀i /∈ A, the state after the receiver notification step (Step 2 of Protocol 1) is
TrA¯0CdA¯inCdA¯outRnA¯inRnA¯inRnA¯out
(ξ
(2)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRninRnout|S=i) = ξ
(2)
A0CdAinCd
A
outRn
A
inRn
A
out|S=i (A4)
= ξ
(2)
A0CdAinCd
A
outRn
A
inRn
A
out
. (A5)
For clarity, we denote the state after the receiver notification (Step 2), given that node i is the sender, by
ξ
(2)
A0A¯0CdinCdoutRninRnout|S=i ≡ σDADHSR|S=i (A6)
where DA =
{
A0Cd
A
inCd
A
outRn
A
inRn
A
out
}
denotes all the registers in possession of the adversary at the end of Step 2.
And similarly, DHSR denotes the registers of the honest parties. Note that, now that sender S and receiver R are
defined, we distinguish them from the subset of honest players.
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Lemma 3. If S and R are honest, the state of the adversary at the end of the receiver notification protocol does not
carry any information about their identity. Let σDA|S=i := TrDHSR [σDADHSR|S=i]; by Ass. 2 and 3 it holds that
σDA|S=i = σDA|S=j = σDA ∀i, j /∈ A, (A7)
and
σDA|R=i = σDA|R=j = σDA ∀i, j /∈ A. (A8)
Step 3. State distribution.
Assumption 4. The N -partite state distributed by a trusted source is |W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR . HereWH is the quantum
register of the honest parties,WA is the quantum register of dishonest parties, andWS andWR are quantum registers
of the sender and receiver.
Therefore, the global state after the source distributed the quantum state (Step 3 of Protocol 1) is
ξ
(3)
WHWAWSWRDADHSR|S=i = |W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i. (A9)
Step 4. Measurement.
Step 4 describes a measurement on quantum registers WHWA and creates the classical registers OHin and O
A
in. The
honest parties perform a projection Π~νWH on the {0, 1} basis and the string of outcomes ~ν is recorded on register OHin .
The adversaries, however, instead of performing the measurement specified by the protocol, can apply an arbitrary
map on their registers and produce a classical outcome |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin . This action is descried by applying a map F
~µ
WADA
labeled by ~µ, which acts on registers WADA and producing a classical outcome |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin in register O
A
in. Note that
this outcome can be a strategy upon which dishonest parties agree and, in particular, it does not have to represent
the actual action of the map F~µ
WADA . Therefore, the state after the parties perform local measurements (Step 4 of
Protocol 1) is described as,
ξ
(4)
WHWAWSWRDADHSROHinO
A
in|S=i
=
∑
~µ,~ν
Π~νWH ⊗F~µWADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i)
⊗ |~ν〉〈~ν|OHin ⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ,
(A10)
where Π~νWH corresponds to a projection of register W
H onto the state |~ν〉〈~ν| in the standard basis.
Step 5. Anonymous announcement of outcomes.
Each of the parties inputs their measurement outcome into the veto protocol. In particular, OHin = |~ν〉〈~ν|OHin is a
private input of the honest parties and OAin = |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin is a private input of the dishonest parties.
Assumption 5. We assume that the classical veto protocol is secure against the quantum adversary; i.e., the veto
protocol acts on the classical registers OHin , O
A
in, and only outputs Oout = 0 if O
H
in = O
A
in =
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣ and 1 otherwise,
and does not reveal any other information.
Then, the state after the veto protocol, where the parties announce their outcomes (Step 5 of Protocol 1), is
ξ
(5)
WHWAWSWRDHASROHinO
A
inOout|S=i
=Π
~0
WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i)
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OHin
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout
+
∑
~µ 6=0,~ν
Π~νWH ⊗F~µWADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i)
⊗ |~ν〉〈~ν|OHin ⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ⊗ |1〉〈1|Oout (A11)
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Step 6. Teleportation.
In Step 6., sender and receiver wish to perform the teleportation. To do so, the sender performs the Bell state
measurement and communicates the classical outcome to the receiver, so that she can correct the teleported state.
The classical communication is carried out by using the classical protocol logical OR.
Assumption 6. The classical logical OR protocol acts on classical registers and does not reveal any information
other than the logical OR of the inputs.
Let Q denote the register of the quantum message which sender S wishes to transmit. More formally, this
step consists of applying a map, a Bell state measurement, acting on the registers of the sender WS and Q and
producing a classical message in the public register T , followed by the receiver applying a unitary operation ac-
cording to the outcome m of the Bell measurement. We denote the map that describes the teleportation step by
TWSWRQOout→WSWRQOoutTSinTRinT . Its action is conditioned on the outcome of Step 5., i.e., public output of the veto
protocol. We define its action on a state φWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q as follows,
TWSWRQ|Oout=0→WSWRQOoutTSinTRinT :=
∑
m
RmWR ◦ BmWSQ(φWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q)
⊗
∑
rand
1
4
|m〉〈m|TSin ⊗ |rand〉〈rand|TRin ⊗ |m⊕ rand〉〈m⊕ rand|T ,
(A12)
TWSWRQ|Oout=1→WSWRQOoutTSinTRinT := 1WSWRQ(φWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q)⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TSin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TRin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|T . (A13)
The map BmWSQ represents the Bell state measurement, on registers WSQ, with outcome m, and the map
RmWR corresponds to the unitary the receiver applies to correct the teleported state. The action of the map
TWSWRQOout→WSWRQOoutTSinTRinT describes that the state |ψ〉〈ψ|Q is either teleported to register WR when Oout = 0
or the protocol aborts when Oout = 1, which we represent by the state |⊥〉〈⊥|T in register T .
However, we note that in this step the adversaries could also deviate from the protocol. In general, they could
perform an arbitrary map in their registers and input a string ~κ 6= ~0 to the logical OR protocol. In that case, the
teleportation step can be described as
TWSWRWADAQ|Oout=0→WSWRWADAQOoutTSinTRinTAinT (ξ
(5)
WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinO
A
inOout|S=i
) :=∑
m,~κ
Rm⊕iκi
WR
◦ G~κWADA ◦ BmWSQ(Π~0WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i))
⊗
∑
rand
1
4
|m〉〈m|TSin ⊗ |rand〉〈rand|TRin ⊗ |~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗ |m⊕ rand⊕i κi〉〈m⊕ rand⊕i κi|T
(A14)
where G~κWADA represents an arbitrary map the adversaries apply to registersWADA, which is followed by the creation
of classical register TAin . Rm⊕iκiR expresses the fact that the receiver now applies a unitary labeled by m⊕i κi instead
of m.
Note that the map G~κWADA only acts on the registers of the adversaries and after the teleportation step (Step 6) no
other operations are performed by the honest parties. The security of the protocol is defined in terms of the guessing
probability, which takes into account an optimization over all maps on the register of the adversary. Therefore, for
the security analysis, we can, without loss of generality, neglect the map G~κADA in the final state, since it is taken into
account in the definition of the guessing probability.
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Finally, the state after the teleportation protocol (Step 6 of Protocol 1) is
ξ
(6)
WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinO
A
inOoutT
S
inT
R
inT
A
inT |S=i
=∑
m,~κ
Rm⊕iκi
WR
◦ BmWSQ(Π~0WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i))
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OHin
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout
⊗
∑
rand
1
4
|m〉〈m|TSin ⊗ |rand〉〈rand|TRin ⊗ |~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗ |m⊕ rand⊕i κi〉〈m⊕ rand⊕i κi|T
+
∑
~µ 6=0,~ν
1WSWRQ(Π
~ν
WH ⊗F~µWADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDADHSR|S=i))
⊗ |~ν〉〈~ν|OHin ⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ⊗ |1〉〈1|Oout ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TSin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TRin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TAin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|T .
(A15)
Observe, however, that the classical registersDHSR, OHin , T
S
inT
R
in are not further acted upon with any map. Moreover,
their content is private, as by Lem. 3 and Ass. 5 and 6 no information about it is revealed to the adversary. Since
we are interested in the information available to the adversary we will trace out these subsystems.
Lemma 4. Let C = {DA, OAin, Oout, TAin , T} represent all the classical and quantum side information accessible to the
adversary at the end of the protocol. The reduced output state of the anonymous transmission protocol with the W
state, where we trace out all private information of the honest parties H, S, and R, given that node i is the sender,
can be described as follows,
ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i =
∑
m,~κ
Rm⊕iκi
WR
◦ BmWSQ(Π~0WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA))
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗ |~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗
1T
4
+
∑
~µ 6=0,~ν
1WSWRQ(Π
~ν
WH ⊗F~µWADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA))
⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ⊗ |1〉〈1|Oout ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TAin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|T (A16)
where we made use of Lem. 3 and the explicitly wrote that the state of register T is maximally mixed.
In summary, Lem. 4 represents the state at the end of the protocol, given that the adversaries might have acted
arbitrarily in Step 4 and under the assumption that, in particular, the classical protocols do not reveal the identities
of the sender and the receiver. We will use this state to prove security in the following section.
3. Security analysis
a. Semiactive adversary
In this section we show that Protocol 1 is sender-secure. The key point of the proof is that security follows from
permutational invariance of the state. Before proving Thm. 1, we first prove the following useful lemma.
Lemma 5. The reduced quantum state of the adversary at the end of the protocol is independent of the sender, i.e.,
∀i /∈ A,
ρWAC|S=i = ρWAC . (A17)
Proof. Let us first consider the case where the receiver is not an adversary, R /∈ A.
By tracing out we have that
ρWAC|S=i = TrWHWSWRQ[ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i], (A18)
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where ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i is the total state at the end of the protocol (A16), Lem. 4, given that i is the sender.
Since Rm⊕iκi
WR
and
∑
m BmWSQ are CPTP, they do not change the trace and thus we can write the first part of Eq.
(A16) as
TrWHWSWRQ
[∑
m,~κ
Rm⊕iκi
WR
◦ BmWSQ(Π~0WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA))
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗ |~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗
1T
4
]
= TrWHWSWRQ
[
Π
~0
WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA)
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗
∑
~κ
|~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗
1T
4
]
= TrWH
[
Π
~0
WH ⊗F~0WADA(W˜WHWA ⊗ σDA)
]
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗
∑
~κ
|~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗
1T
4
(A19)
where W˜WHWA is the reduced W state on registers WH and WA after tracing out WS and WR, i.e. W˜WHWA =
TrWSWR(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR), and similarly for the second term of (A16). So,
ρWAC|S=i = TrWH
[
Π
~0
WH ⊗F~0WADA(W˜WHWA ⊗ σDA)
]
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗
∑
~κ
|~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗
1T
4
+
∑
~µ 6=0,~ν
TrWH
[
Π~νWH ⊗F~µWADA(W˜WHWA ⊗ σDA)
]
⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ⊗ |1〉〈1|Oout ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TAin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|T (A20)
But since the state distributed by the source is permutationally invariant, it holds that
W˜WHWA = TrWS=iWR(|W〉〈W|WHWAWS=iWR) = TrWS=jWR(|W〉〈W|WHWAWS=jWR), ∀i, j /∈ A (A21)
Since no other part of the state ρWAC|S=i depends on the sender, the state ρWAC|S=i must be the same for all senders
and we denote ρWAC|S=i = ρWAC . Note that the same statement holds when the receiver is honest since,
TrWSWR=i(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR=i) = TrWSWR=j (|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR=j ), ∀i, j /∈ A (A22)
and, therefore, ρWAC|R=i = ρWAC .
Now we proceed to the proof of this statement in the case where the receiver is an adversary.
If the receiver is dishonest then the teleportation map has to take into account the fact that the adversaries
can apply an arbitrary map instead of Rm⊕iκi
WR
. Also, now the output of the teleportation m is known to the
adversaries and the map F~µ
WADA could initially also act on the receiver’s register. Now we can model the action of
the receiver after receiving m by an arbitrary map that acts on all the registers in possession of the adversaries, i.e.,
Rm⊕iκi
WR
−→ R′WAWRCTAinT and instead of (A16), the final state of the protocol is described by
ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i = R′WAWRCTAinT ◦
(∑
m,~κ
BmWSQ(Π~0WH ⊗F~0WADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA))
⊗
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
OAin
⊗ |0〉〈0|Oout ⊗ |~κ〉〈~κ|TAin ⊗ |m〉〈m|T
)
+
∑
~µ 6=0,~ν
1WSWRQ ◦ (Π~νWH ⊗F~µWADA(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDA))
⊗ |~µ〉〈~µ|OAin ⊗ |1〉〈1|Oout ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|TAin ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|T (A23)
Let us look at the reduced final state of the adversary, which now includes the receiver, ρWAWRC|S=i =
TrWHWSQ[ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i]. By the permutational invariance of the state generated by the source we have
that the state at the end of the protocol given that node i is the sender is equivalent to the state given that node j
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is the sender up to a permutation of i and j,
ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=i = Pi↔j(ρWHWAWSWRQC|S=j). (A24)
Therefore tracing out the sender and the other honest parties, the remaining states are equal
ρWAWRC|S=i = ρWAWRC|S=j , (A25)
which proves anonymity of the sender even if the receiver is dishonest.
Proof Thm. 1 (sender security). Here we focus on proving sender security. The receiver security is formally stated in
Thm. 10G. iven Lem. 5, we have that
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] = max{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr[M i · ρWAC|S=i] (A26)
= max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr[M i · ρWAC] (A27)
≤ max
i
P [S = i|S /∈ A] max
{Mi}
Tr
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
M i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1WAC
·ρWAC
]
(A28)
= max
i
P [S = i|S /∈ A] (A29)
Analogously, we will prove the following statement for the receiver-security.
Theorem 10 (receiver security). The anonymous transmission protocol, Protocol 1, with the W state is receiver-secure
in the semiactive adversary scenario, i.e.
max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [R = i|WA, C,R /∈ A] Tr[M i · ρWAC|R=i] ≤ max
i
P [R = i|R /∈ A], (A30)
given that the receiver is honest.
Proof. By the proof of Lem. 5, it follows that the reduced quantum state of the adversary at the end of the protocol
is independent of the receiver, i.e., ρWAC|R=i = ρWAC ,∀i /∈ A. Therefore,
Pguess[R|WA, C,R /∈ A] = max{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [R = i|R /∈ A] Tr[M i · ρWAC|R=i] (A31)
≤ max
i
P [R = i|R /∈ A] max
{Mi}
Tr
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
M i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1WAC
·ρWAC
]
(A32)
= max
i
P [R = i|R /∈ A] (A33)
b. Passive adversary
Definition 7. Let H be the subset of honest players, excluding S and R, and A be the subset of passive adversaries.
Let C be the register that contains all classical information accessible to the adversaries, i.e., the public outputs of
the classical subprotocols, plus all the inputs and outputs of the adversaries to these classical subprotocols, C =
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{DA, OAin, Oout, TAin , T}. Then probability of the adversaries guessing the sender is given by
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] =
∑
a,c
P [WA = a,C = c] max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|WA = a,C = c, S /∈ A], (A34)
where maximization is taken over all the values of random variable S, and a and c are possible values of random
variables WA and C respectively. Note that, unlike before, here WA is a classical register of the adversary, since their
share of the W state was measured in the {0, 1} basis. An analogous expression holds for receiver-security.
The proof for the passive adversary security scenario is a special case of the proof for the semiactive adversary
scenario. Indeed, it corresponds to the case where the arbitrary map of the adversary, F~µ
WADA , is a measurement in
the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and TAin = ~0. Let us first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6. The probability of registers WA and C assuming certain values a and c is independent of the sender,
P [WA = a,C = c|S = i, S /∈ A] = P [WA = a,C = c] (A35)
Proof. In the passive adversary scenario, the dishonest parties follow the protocol, therefore the map F~0WADA is
replaced by a projector onto the
∣∣∣~0〉〈~0∣∣∣
WA
subspace, i.e. Π~0WA . By the permutational invariance argument the state,
in this case classical, is independent of the sender S (or the receiver R), which completes the proof.
Proof of Thm. 2. Let us expand the probability appearing in the security definition (A34)
P [S = i|WA = a,C = c, S /∈ A] = P [W
A = a,C = c|S = i, S /∈ A]P [S = i|S /∈ A]
P [WA = a,C = c]
(A36)
=
P [WA = a,C = c|S = i]P [S = i|S /∈ A]
P [WA = a,C = c]
(A37)
= P [S = i|S /∈ A] (A38)
where in (A37) we used Lem. 6. Therefore, (A34) becomes,
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] =
∑
a,c
P [WA = a,C = c] max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] (A39)
= max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A]. (A40)
Appendix B: Anoymous transmission in a noisy quantum network
1. Proof for ε-security
Here we provide a proof of Thm. 4 for ε-sender security.
Proof of Thm. 4. The idea of our proof is to show that, for all i, the trace Tr
[
M i · ρˆΛWAC|S=i
]
can be upper-bounded
by Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
+ Nεmax. Then using the fact that Nεmax is independent of i, the rest of the proof follows
from Thm. 3.
Let us look at the following expression, ∀i,∣∣∣Tr[M iρˆΛWAC|S=i]− Tr [M iρΛWAC|S=i]∣∣∣
≤
∥∥∥ρˆΛWAC|S=i − ρΛWAC|S=i∥∥∥
1
(B1)
≤
∥∥∥ξ′Λ (6)WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinOAinOoutTSinTRinTAinT |S=i − ξΛ (6)WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinOAinOoutTSinTRinTAinT |S=i∥∥∥1,
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where ξ′Λ (6)
WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinO
A
inOoutT
S
inT
R
inT
A
inT |S=i
and ξΛ (6)
WHWAWSWRQDHASROHinO
A
inOoutT
S
inT
R
inT
A
inT |S=i
are final states
of the protocol after Step 6 (defined analogously to equation (A15)) when the network is perturbed (5), or not (3),
respectively. Since the protocol is described by a CPTP map, the trace distance of the final state is upper-bounded
by the trace distance of the initial state,∣∣∣Tr[M iρˆΛWAC|S=i]− Tr [M iρΛWAC|S=i]∣∣∣
≤
∥∥∥ω′ΛWHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDHASR|S=i − ωΛWHWAWSWR ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ⊗ σDHASR|S=i∥∥∥
1
(B2)
≤ ∥∥ω′ΛWHWAWSWR − ωΛWHWAWSWR∥∥1 (B3)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
N⊗
i=1
Λi(|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR)− Λ⊗N (|W〉〈W|WHWAWSWR)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(B4)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
N⊗
i=1
Λi − Λ⊗N
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
N∑
i=1
‖Λi − Λ‖1 =
N∑
i=1
εi ≤ Nεmax (B5)
where we used the properties of the trace distance and the induced trace norm. Therefore we have that, ∀i
Tr
[
M i · ρˆΛWAC|S=i
]
≤ Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
+Nεmax (B6)
so using Thm. 3,
Pguess[S|WA, C, S /∈ A] = max{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr
[
M i · ρˆΛWAC|S=i
]
(B7)
≤ max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A]
(
Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
+Nεmax
)
(B8)
= max
{Mi}
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] Tr
[
M i · ρΛWAC|S=i
]
+
∑
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A]Nεmax (B9)
≤ max
i∈[N ]
P [S = i|S /∈ A] +Nεmax. (B10)
The same argument holds for receiver-security.
2. Performance in a noisy network
Fidelity derivation. In general, it is non-trivial to derive analytical expressions for fidelity of anonymous en-
tanglement in the presence of noise. The most troublesome part is to obtain analytical expressions for anonymous
entangled states shared between S and R, which are affected by the noise. Nevertheless, to obtain these explicit
formulas, we used the fact that the noise is described by a linear map which acts on each qubit individually. We will
illustrate the gist of our derivation with an example for the GHZ state, since it is easier to follow than the one for the
W state.
As defined in the main text, the state shared by S and R in the noisy case is
γSR =
1
N ′ TrN−2
[
Λ⊗N (|GHZ〉〈GHZ|N ) ·
∣∣~+〉〈~+∣∣
N−2
]
, (B11)
where N is the normalization factor. Note that the GHZ state can be written as
|GHZ〉〈GHZ|N =
1
2
(
|0〉〈0|⊗N + |0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N + |1〉〈1|⊗N
)
(B12)
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Due to the tensor structure and linearity of the noise, we can write that
γSR =
1
2N ′ TrN−2
[(
Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗N + Λ(|0〉〈1|)⊗N + Λ(|1〉〈0|)⊗N + Λ(|1〉〈1|)⊗N) · |+〉〈+|⊗N−2]
=
1
2N ′
(
Tr[Λ(|0〉〈0|)]N−2Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗2 + Tr[Λ(|0〉〈1|)]N−2Λ(|0〉〈1|)⊗2
+ Tr[Λ(|1〉〈0|)]N−2Λ(|1〉〈0|)⊗2 + Tr[Λ(|1〉〈1|)]N−2Λ(|1〉〈1|)⊗2
)
.
(B13)
This way one only takes the tensor product of the two terms corresponding to S and R, instead of taking the tensor
of N terms. The expression for the W state follows the exact same pattern, but one has to account for all the
combinations of 0’s and 1’s occurring in the state |W〉〈W|N . Let trxy := Tr[Λ(|x〉〈y|) · |0〉〈0|] with x, y = {0, 1}. Then
the state ωSR shared between S and R in the noisy implementation of Protocol 1 is
ωSR =
1
N
(
(N − 2)(N − 3)tr01tr10trN−400 Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈0|)
+ (N − 2)tr10trN−300
(
Λ(|0〉〈1|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈0|) + Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈1|))
+ (N − 2)tr01trN−300
(
Λ(|1〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈0|) + Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|1〉〈0|))
+ (N − 2)tr11trN−300 Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈0|)
+ trN−200
(
Λ(|0〉〈1|)⊗ Λ(|1〉〈0|) + Λ(|1〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈1|) + Λ(|0〉〈0|)⊗ Λ(|1〉〈1|) + Λ(|1〉〈1|)⊗ Λ(|0〉〈0|))).
(B14)
Using the explicit form of Λ for the depolarizing and dephasing noise, after easy but tedious calculations, one obtains
explicit fidelity expressions derived from Eq. (12) and (13).
Dephasing and depolarizing noise. In this section we provide additional details to the noise analysis provided
in the main text. First, we plot the behavior of our protocol vs. the GHZ-based protocol under the dephasing noise,
for examples N = {4, 10, 50}, Fig. 5. Note that the GHZ state is increasingly useful according to Def. 6 for q < 0.5.
For anonymous entanglement created with the W state this is always the case, however, for the GHZ only for even
N . To observe the same behavior for odd N and the GHZ state one would have to redefine Eq. (13) to compare the
fidelity with the state |φ−〉〈φ−|.
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FIG. 5: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement as a
function of the noise parameter for the dephasing
channel.
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FIG. 6: Noise parameter threshold for the
depolarizing noise. Close-up to 179 ≤ N ≤ 185.
As discussed, the noise parameter threshold q∗ for N = 182 nodes becomes larger for the W state: q∗W = 0.979057,
q∗GHZ = 0.979043, q
∗
W > q
∗
GHZ . This means that for N ≥ 182 the W state tolerates less noise than the GHZ; see Fig.
6. However, we numerically see that there exists a value of q > q∗W for which FAE(ωSR) > FAE(γSR). As an example
for N = 400 see Fig. 7.
Moreover, we provide an analytical expression for the probability of success in our protocol, defined as PωSR :=
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FIG. 7: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement for
N = 400.
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FIG. 8: Probability of success in Protocol 1 in the
presence of the depolarizing noise, N = {4, 10, 50}.
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FIG. 9: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement for
Protocol 1, as a function of the noise parameter for
the dephasing channel in the presence of one
particle loss.
Tr
[
Λ⊗N (|W〉〈W|N ) · |~0〉〈~0|N−2
]
, which for the depolarizing noise assumes the form,
PωSR =
(q + 1)N−3(N(1− q) + 4q)
N2N−2
. (B15)
Examples of PωSR as a function of q for N = {4, 10, 50} are plotted in Fig. 8. Note that for the dephasing noise
PωSR =
2
N , since the measurement basis is not affected by the Z noise.
Particle loss. In the case when one of the particles of the W state is lost and the state is subjected to the network
noise, the fidelity of anonymous entanglement can be expressed as
FAE(ω˜SR) =
(1 + q)(N2(q − 1)2 − 8q2 + 4Nq(1 + q))
4N(N(1− q) + 4q) (B16)
for the depolarizing noise, and
FAE(ω˜SR) =
N − 1
N
(1− 2q(1− q)). (B17)
for the dephasing noise. In Fig. 9 we plot the examples of FAE for N = {4, 10, 50} when the initial W state is
subjected to one particle loss and the dephasing noise.
Relay protocol. Finally, in Tab. II we present the values for anonymous entanglement in the relay protocol [7] in
21
the presence of the depolarizing noise.
TABLE II: Fidelity of anonymous entanglement for the relay scheme [7] in the N -fold noisy network for the
depolarizing channel. Note that for the depolarizing parameter q = 0.8 the anonymous entanglement created
between nodes 1 and 6 is not useful in the sense of Def. 6.
Scenario FAE for q = 0.8 FAE for q = 0.95
0.5738 0.8625
0.6138 0.8744
0.5418 0.8512
0.5162 0.8405
0.4958 0.8303
